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Cover: 9780197688984 | Answering Moral Skepticism | Shelly Kagan | Taschenbuch | Englisch
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Answering Moral Skepticism
Taschenbuch von Shelly Kagan
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
This book is an accessible defence of the belief in objective morality. Most books on metaethics-the part of moral philosophy that investigates the existence and nature of morality-primarily discuss problems that particularly intrigue specialists in the field. Answering Moral Skepticism focuses instead on examining the worries about morality that are more likely to trouble ordinary reflective individuals.
This book is an accessible defence of the belief in objective morality. Most books on metaethics-the part of moral philosophy that investigates the existence and nature of morality-primarily discuss problems that particularly intrigue specialists in the field. Answering Moral Skepticism focuses instead on examining the worries about morality that are more likely to trouble ordinary reflective individuals.
Über den Autor
Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Acknowledgments

  • A Note to the Reader

  • Introduction

  • 1. What Would Morality Need to Be?

  • 1.1 Job Descriptions

  • 1.2 Possible Elements

  • 1.3 Satisfying the Job Description

  • 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics

  • 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism

  • 2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism

  • 2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism

  • 2.4 Moral Skepticism

  • 3. Nihilism

  • 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism

  • 3.2 The Case for Nihilism

  • 3.3 Disregarding the Arguments

  • 3.4 Normative Nihilism

  • 4. Noncognitivism

  • 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism

  • 4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism

  • 4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism

  • 5. Disagreement

  • 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement

  • 5.2 The Implications of Disagreement

  • 5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement

  • 5.4 Nonconvergence

  • 6. Relativism

  • 6.1 Moral Relativism

  • 6.2 Clarifying Relativism

  • 6.3 Arguing for Relativism

  • 6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories

  • 7. Knowledge

  • 7.1 The Analogy to Observation

  • 7.2 Appearances

  • 7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions

  • 7.4 Reliability

  • 7.5 Intuitionism

  • 8. Evolution

  • 8.1 The Argument from Evolution

  • 8.2 A Second Try

  • 8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics

  • 8.4 Common Ground

  • 8.5 The Continuity Problem

  • 8.6 Path Dependence

  • 9. Explanation

  • 9.1 A Metaphysical Test

  • 9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts

  • 9.3 Reduction and Explanation

  • 9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts

  • 9.5 The Unrestricted Test

  • 10. Motivation

  • 10.1 Motive Internalism

  • 10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism

  • 10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism

  • 10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation

  • 10.5 The Direction of Fit

  • 11. Reasons

  • 11.1 Reasons Internalism

  • 11.2 Reasons

  • 11.3 Refining the Argument

  • 11.4 Hypothetical Reasons

  • 11.5 Rational Support

  • 11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation

  • 12. Reductionism

  • 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism

  • 12.2 The Nature of Reduction

  • 12.3 The Open Question Argument

  • 12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind

  • 12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction

  • 12.6 Reducing Reasons

  • 13. Simple Realism

  • 13.1 Simple Normative Realism

  • 13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity

  • 13.3 Nonnatural Properties

  • 13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals

  • 14. Moral Realism

  • 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic

  • 14.2 Systematic Moral Theory

  • Notes

  • References

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2024
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780197688984
ISBN-10: 0197688985
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Kagan, Shelly
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
OUP USA
Abbildungen: 2 b/w charts
Maße: 227 x 157 x 30 mm
Von/Mit: Shelly Kagan
Erscheinungsdatum: 29.02.2024
Gewicht: 0,576 kg
Artikel-ID: 126549777
Über den Autor
Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • Acknowledgments

  • A Note to the Reader

  • Introduction

  • 1. What Would Morality Need to Be?

  • 1.1 Job Descriptions

  • 1.2 Possible Elements

  • 1.3 Satisfying the Job Description

  • 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics

  • 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism

  • 2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism

  • 2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism

  • 2.4 Moral Skepticism

  • 3. Nihilism

  • 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism

  • 3.2 The Case for Nihilism

  • 3.3 Disregarding the Arguments

  • 3.4 Normative Nihilism

  • 4. Noncognitivism

  • 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism

  • 4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism

  • 4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism

  • 5. Disagreement

  • 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement

  • 5.2 The Implications of Disagreement

  • 5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement

  • 5.4 Nonconvergence

  • 6. Relativism

  • 6.1 Moral Relativism

  • 6.2 Clarifying Relativism

  • 6.3 Arguing for Relativism

  • 6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories

  • 7. Knowledge

  • 7.1 The Analogy to Observation

  • 7.2 Appearances

  • 7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions

  • 7.4 Reliability

  • 7.5 Intuitionism

  • 8. Evolution

  • 8.1 The Argument from Evolution

  • 8.2 A Second Try

  • 8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics

  • 8.4 Common Ground

  • 8.5 The Continuity Problem

  • 8.6 Path Dependence

  • 9. Explanation

  • 9.1 A Metaphysical Test

  • 9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts

  • 9.3 Reduction and Explanation

  • 9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts

  • 9.5 The Unrestricted Test

  • 10. Motivation

  • 10.1 Motive Internalism

  • 10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism

  • 10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism

  • 10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation

  • 10.5 The Direction of Fit

  • 11. Reasons

  • 11.1 Reasons Internalism

  • 11.2 Reasons

  • 11.3 Refining the Argument

  • 11.4 Hypothetical Reasons

  • 11.5 Rational Support

  • 11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation

  • 12. Reductionism

  • 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism

  • 12.2 The Nature of Reduction

  • 12.3 The Open Question Argument

  • 12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind

  • 12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction

  • 12.6 Reducing Reasons

  • 13. Simple Realism

  • 13.1 Simple Normative Realism

  • 13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity

  • 13.3 Nonnatural Properties

  • 13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals

  • 14. Moral Realism

  • 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic

  • 14.2 Systematic Moral Theory

  • Notes

  • References

  • Index

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2024
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780197688984
ISBN-10: 0197688985
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Kagan, Shelly
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
OUP USA
Abbildungen: 2 b/w charts
Maße: 227 x 157 x 30 mm
Von/Mit: Shelly Kagan
Erscheinungsdatum: 29.02.2024
Gewicht: 0,576 kg
Artikel-ID: 126549777
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