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Commonsense Consequentialism
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality
Taschenbuch von Douglas W. Portmore
Sprache: Englisch

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Beschreibung
Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Über den Autor
Douglas W. Portmore is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he also writes on wellbeing, posthumous harm, and the nonidentity problem.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • 1. Why I Am Not a Utilitarian

  • 1.1 Utilitarianism: The good, the bad, and the ugly

  • 1.2 The plan for the rest of the book

  • 1.3 My aims

  • 1.4 Objective oughts and objective reasons

  • 1.5 Conventions that I will follow throughout the book

  • 2. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism

  • 2.1 The too-demanding objection: How moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism

  • 2.2 The argument against utilitarianism from moral rationalism

  • 2.3 How moral rationalism compels us to accept consequentialism

  • 2.4 What is consequentialism?

  • 2.5 The presumptive case for moral rationalism

  • 2.6 Some concluding remarks

  • 3. The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons

  • 3.1 Getting clear on what the view is

  • 3.2 Clearing up some misconceptions about the view

  • 3.3 Scanlon's putative counterexamples to the view

  • 3.4 Arguments for the view

  • 4. Consequentializing Commonsense Morality

  • 4.1 How to consequentialize

  • 4.2 The deontic equivalence thesis

  • 4.3 Beyond the deontic equivalence thesis: How consequentialist theories can do a better job of accounting for our considered moral convictions than even some nonconsequentialist theories can

  • 4.4 The implications of the deontic equivalence thesis

  • 4.5 An objection

  • 5. Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness

  • 5.1 Some quick clarifications

  • 5.2 Moral reasons, overridingness, and agent-centered options

  • 5.3 Moral reasons, overridingness, and supererogation

  • 5.4 A meta-criterion of rightness and how it leads us to adopt dual-ranking act-consequentialism

  • 5.5 Norcross's objection

  • 5.6 Splawn's objection

  • 5.7 Violations of the transitivity and independence axioms

  • 6. Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options

  • 6.1 Kagan's objection: Are we sacrificing rational options to get moral options?

  • 6.2 Imperfect reasons and rational options

  • 6.3 Securitism

  • 6.4 Securitism and the basic belief

  • 6.5 Securitism's suppositions and implications

  • 7. Commonsense Consequentialism

  • 7.1 The best version of act-utilitarianism: commonsense utilitarianism

  • 7.2 Securitist consequentialism and the argument for it

  • 7.3 Commonsense consequentialism and how it compares with traditional act-consequentialism

  • 7.4 What has been shown and what remains to be shown

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780199396450
ISBN-10: 0199396450
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Portmore, Douglas W.
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 17 mm
Von/Mit: Douglas W. Portmore
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.07.2014
Gewicht: 0,494 kg
Artikel-ID: 108612094
Über den Autor
Douglas W. Portmore is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Arizona State University. His research focuses mainly on morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two, but he also writes on wellbeing, posthumous harm, and the nonidentity problem.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
  • 1. Why I Am Not a Utilitarian

  • 1.1 Utilitarianism: The good, the bad, and the ugly

  • 1.2 The plan for the rest of the book

  • 1.3 My aims

  • 1.4 Objective oughts and objective reasons

  • 1.5 Conventions that I will follow throughout the book

  • 2. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism

  • 2.1 The too-demanding objection: How moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism

  • 2.2 The argument against utilitarianism from moral rationalism

  • 2.3 How moral rationalism compels us to accept consequentialism

  • 2.4 What is consequentialism?

  • 2.5 The presumptive case for moral rationalism

  • 2.6 Some concluding remarks

  • 3. The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons

  • 3.1 Getting clear on what the view is

  • 3.2 Clearing up some misconceptions about the view

  • 3.3 Scanlon's putative counterexamples to the view

  • 3.4 Arguments for the view

  • 4. Consequentializing Commonsense Morality

  • 4.1 How to consequentialize

  • 4.2 The deontic equivalence thesis

  • 4.3 Beyond the deontic equivalence thesis: How consequentialist theories can do a better job of accounting for our considered moral convictions than even some nonconsequentialist theories can

  • 4.4 The implications of the deontic equivalence thesis

  • 4.5 An objection

  • 5. Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness

  • 5.1 Some quick clarifications

  • 5.2 Moral reasons, overridingness, and agent-centered options

  • 5.3 Moral reasons, overridingness, and supererogation

  • 5.4 A meta-criterion of rightness and how it leads us to adopt dual-ranking act-consequentialism

  • 5.5 Norcross's objection

  • 5.6 Splawn's objection

  • 5.7 Violations of the transitivity and independence axioms

  • 6. Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options

  • 6.1 Kagan's objection: Are we sacrificing rational options to get moral options?

  • 6.2 Imperfect reasons and rational options

  • 6.3 Securitism

  • 6.4 Securitism and the basic belief

  • 6.5 Securitism's suppositions and implications

  • 7. Commonsense Consequentialism

  • 7.1 The best version of act-utilitarianism: commonsense utilitarianism

  • 7.2 Securitist consequentialism and the argument for it

  • 7.3 Commonsense consequentialism and how it compares with traditional act-consequentialism

  • 7.4 What has been shown and what remains to be shown

Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Fachbereich: Allgemeines
Genre: Importe, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Antike
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Thema: Lexika
Medium: Taschenbuch
ISBN-13: 9780199396450
ISBN-10: 0199396450
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Portmore, Douglas W.
Hersteller: Oxford University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße: 234 x 156 x 17 mm
Von/Mit: Douglas W. Portmore
Erscheinungsdatum: 01.07.2014
Gewicht: 0,494 kg
Artikel-ID: 108612094
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