Silvia Jonas is a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow at The Van Leer Institute and a Visiting Researcher at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel. She completed her PhD at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and holds a BPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford as well as an MLitt in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews, UK.

1. Introduction


1.1. Getting a Grip on the Topic


1.2. The Relevant Cases


1.3. A Brief History of Ineffability


1.4. Four Ways of Predicate Application


1.5. Structure of the Book


2. Terminology


2.1. Content


2.2. Representations


2.3. Experience


2.4. Truth and Truth-Bearers


2.5. Expressibility and Ineffability


3. Ineffable Properties and Objects


3.1. Why Ineffable Properties and Objects?


3.2. The Absolute


3.3. Haecceities


3.4. Bare Particulars


4. Ineffable Propositions


4.1. Why Ineffable Propositions?


4.2. Inaccessibility


4.3. Semantic Paradoxes


4.4. Unformulable Mathematical Propositions


4.5. Excess Propositions


4.6. Perspective Propositions


5. Ineffable Content


5.1. Why Ineffable Content?


5.2. Non-Conceptual Concept in Perception


5.3. The Contents of Aesthetic Experience


5.4. The Contents of Religious Experience


6. Ineffable Knowledge I


6.1. Why Ineffable Knowledge?


6.2. Objective Ineffable Knowledge


6.3. Knowledge-How


6.4. Basic Logical Knowledge


6.5. Non-Representational Knowledge


7. Ineffable Knowledge II


7.1. Subjective Ineffable Knowledge


7.2. Indexical Knowledge


7.3. Phenomenal Knowledge


7.4. Self-Acquaintance


8. Conclusion


9. Bibliography