Richard L. Russell is Professor of National Security Affairs at the National Defense University's Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. He also holds academic appointments as Adjunct Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and Research Associate in the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Russell is the author of Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest and George F. Kennan's Strategic Thought: The Making of an American Political Realist. He previously served seventeen years as a political-military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he analyzed security issues in the Middle East and Europe. He received numerous CIA Exceptional Performance Awards, two of which were for his work during the Gulf War and the Kosovo War. Russell has been interviewed on National Public Radio, ABC News, and CNN and his analysis has appeared in leading publications to include the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, The New Republic, The Weekly Standard, USA Today, and US News and World Report. He holds a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Critically examines the weaknesses of American intelligence led by the Central Intelligence Agency in informing presidential decision making on issues of war and peace. Evaluates the CIA’s strategic intelligence performance during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as a foundation for examining the intelligence failures surrounding the September 11th attacks and assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The book probes the root causes of these intelligence failures, which lie in the CIA’s poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices, and makes recommendations for redressing these profound shortcomings.

1. Strategic intelligence and American statecraft; 2. Debunking Cold War myths; 3. Stumbling after the Cold War; 4. Blundering in the 'War on Terror'; 5. Spies who do not deliver; 6. Analysts who are not experts; 7. Facing future strategic intelligence challenges.