This book examines the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination and its use as a protective device; arguing that it has been both misinterpreted and misapplied. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination has been extended by a process of flawed development, which has meant that we have lost sight of the origin and reason for the creation of the Privilege and have carried it far beyond the reach of any justification its original development may have possessed. As a consequence of the misapplication of the Privilege by the European Court of Human Rights, at least insofar as English law is concerned, it has been accorded a greater weight than it should otherwise attract, allowing criminals to rely on the criminality of their own acts to escape the just claims of their victims. This book examines the historical basis for the creation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and considers the subsequent development of the doctrine by the English courts and European Court of Human Rights.